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What, if anything, gives a state sufficiently plenary power over 
a person that the state may adjudicate claims against the person even 
if the claims arose elsewhere? Particularly with regard to 
corporations, this basic question has lacked a clear answer. The 
standard for general jurisdiction remains unsatisfactorily vague, with 
ambiguous Supreme Court guidance on doctrine and even less 
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explanation of why such jurisdiction exists. The coming Supreme 
Court term offers the Court an opportunity to clarify. 
The case before the Supreme Court—DaimlerChrysler AG v. 
Bauman1—presents an easy jurisdictional question on its facts. 
Argentine plaintiffs sued a German corporation based on events that 
occurred in Argentina. They filed their lawsuit in California,2 
although the claims did not arise out of California and the defendant 
had no physical presence in California. Unless the Supreme Court 
takes an expansive view of imputed contacts through corporate 
subsidiaries, which would be surprising, the Court likely will reverse 
the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that California had general jurisdiction over 
DaimlerChrysler AG. Nevertheless, the case offers the Court an 
opportunity to clarify the general jurisdiction standard it announced 
two years ago in Goodyear Dunlop Tires, S.A. v. Brown.3 
Goodyear, too, was an easy case.4 The Supreme Court 
unanimously rejected the state court ruling that North Carolina had 
general jurisdiction over three foreign Goodyear subsidiaries.5 But 
despite the ease of the Goodyear case, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for 
the Court offered a revised formulation of the standard for general 
jurisdiction over corporations. Rather than rely solely on earlier 
language about “continuous and systematic” contacts,6 Justice 
Ginsburg drew an analogy to an individual’s domicile and described 
 
 1.  644 F.3d 909, 921–24 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013).  
 2.  The case was brought in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. 
Because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k) permits a federal court to exercise personal 
jurisdiction if a state court could do so, the case raises the issue of the territorial limits of 
California courts. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A). 
 3.  131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). Before 2011, the Supreme Court had addressed general 
jurisdiction over corporations only twice, in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 
466 U.S. 408 (1984), and Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 4.  For commentaries noting the one-sidedness of Goodyear in light of prior decisions, see 
Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 60 KAN. L. REV. 549, 573 (2012); Linda J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro: 
Observations from a Transnational and Comparative Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 591, 612 (2012); 
Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 
527 (2012). 
 5.  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857.   
 6.  See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416 (finding that defendant lacked “the kind of continuous 
and systematic general business contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins”); Perkins, 342 U.S. 
at 445 (noting that defendant had been carrying on “continuous and systematic” business in 
Ohio, where it had established temporary headquarters while its foreign operations were halted). 
When the Supreme Court introduced the “continuous and systematic” language, it was in the 
context of specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction. See International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (“ ‘Presence’ in the state in this sense has never been 
doubted when the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and 
systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on . . . .”); id. at 320 (noting that International 
Shoe’s activities in Washington “were systematic and continuous throughout the years in 
question”). 
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the general jurisdiction standard in terms of whether the corporation 
was “essentially at home in the forum State.”7 The Court concluded 
that North Carolina could not assert general jurisdiction because the 
defendants were “in no sense at home in North Carolina.”8 
The home-state test for general jurisdiction makes sense but 
remains both under-theorized and ambiguously expressed. In 
DaimlerChrysler, the Court has a chance not only to express the 
home-state test with greater clarity, but also to explain why the home-
state test makes sense for general jurisdiction.9 In addition, the 
DaimlerChrysler case raises questions about imputation of corporate 
contacts. Explicit adoption of a home-state test would allow the Court 
to explain why the contacts of an agent do not establish general 
jurisdiction over a principal. 
II. WHY THE HOME-STATE TEST MAKES SENSE FOR GENERAL 
JURISDICTION 
A. Specific Jurisdiction versus General Jurisdiction 
In both Goodyear and DaimlerChrysler, judges failed to 
appreciate fully the difference between specific and general 
jurisdiction. In Goodyear, this failure led to the North Carolina courts’ 
misapplication of the stream-of-commerce theory. In DaimlerChrysler, 
it led to the Ninth Circuit’s misapplication of agency principles. In 
each case, the courts seemed to treat general jurisdiction as merely a 
variation on specific jurisdiction with a higher level of contacts.10 
The crucial difference between specific jurisdiction and general 
jurisdiction is not a quantitative difference in the level of required 
contacts; it is a qualitative difference in the basis of the state’s 
 
 7.  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. 
 8.  Id. at 2857. 
 9.  The Supreme Court could decline to address the jurisdictional questions in 
DaimlerChrysler because the plaintiffs’ primary substantive claims may have been undermined 
by Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (addressing the Alien Tort 
Statute) and Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012) (addressing the Torture 
Victims Protection Act). This article proceeds on the assumption that the Supreme Court will 
take the opportunity to address the important question on which it granted certiorari. 
 10.  Perhaps the problem can be traced to International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310 (1945). In that case, which was one of specific jurisdiction, the Supreme Court introduced the 
concept of general jurisdiction by mentioning that “there have been instances in which the 
continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature 
as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those 
activities.” Id. at 318. Notably, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) made no distinctions based 
on whether claims were related or unrelated to the forum state. As Allan Stein points out, “the 
distinction between general and specific jurisdiction is an artifact of the post-International Shoe 
model.” Stein, supra note 4, at 534. 
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adjudicatory power. Specific jurisdiction is justified by a state’s 
regulatory interest in the conduct at issue. General jurisdiction is 
justified by the relationship between a state and those who make the 
state their home. Although both specific jurisdiction and general 
jurisdiction concern a defendant’s due process right not to be subject to 
the coercive power of an unrelated sovereign, the two types of 
jurisdiction involve different ways that a sovereign may relate to the 
controversy. 
Specific jurisdiction begins with the connection between the 
controversy and the forum state. By acting purposefully toward the 
state, the defendant subjects itself to the state’s adjudicatory power 
with regard to claims that arise out of that conduct. The Supreme 
Court explained in International Shoe that in-state conduct  “may give 
rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are 
connected with the activities within the state, a procedure that requires 
the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in 
most instances, hardly be said to be undue.”11 
General jurisdiction, by contrast, does not begin with a 
relationship between the controversy and the forum state. Rather, the 
logic of general jurisdiction begins and ends with the relationship 
between the defendant and the forum state. By definition, the 
controversy need not have any connection to the forum state other 
than through the state’s relationship with the defendant. General 
jurisdiction asks whether the defendant’s relationship with the forum 
state is such that the relationship alone gives the state power to 
adjudicate any controversy with regard to that defendant. 
B. General Jurisdiction and the Citizen-State Relationship 
General jurisdiction is premised on the idea that a connection 
between a person and a sovereign may be significant enough that it 
gives the sovereign a kind of plenary power over the person, a power 
that extends beyond state boundaries. The logic of general jurisdiction 
is that a state has power over its citizens that is not entirely confined 
to in-state activities. A state may tax its citizens’ out-of-state income,12 
 
 11.  International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (emphasis added); see also J. McIntyre Machinery 
v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) (Kennedy, J., plurality) (“The question is whether a 
defendant has followed a course of conduct directed at the society or economy existing within the 
jurisdiction of a given sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject the defendant to 
judgment concerning that conduct.”). 
 12.  See Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n of Miss., 286 U.S. 276, 279 (1932) (holding that a 
state has power to tax its citizens “on income derived wholly from activities carried on outside 
the state,” because “domicile, in itself, establishes a basis for taxation.”); Meir Feder, Goodyear, 
“Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 691 
(2012). 
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summon its citizens to return for jury duty,13 and in other ways 
regulate its citizens’ out-of-state activities.14 
In Milliken v. Meyer, the Supreme Court explained jurisdiction 
in terms of each state’s power over its citizens. Drawing a connection 
to “the authority of the United States over its absent citizens,” the 
Court explained that “the authority of a state over one of its citizens is 
not terminated by the mere fact of his absence from the state.”15 The 
incidents of domicile include amenability to suit, and “[t]he 
responsibilities of [state] citizenship arise out of the relationship to the 
state which domicile creates.”16 The Milliken opinion does not draw 
clear distinctions among residence, domicile, and citizenship, but the 
mix of terminology does not obscure the Court’s straightforward 
reasoning: when a person establishes a home-state relationship with a 
state, the relationship gives the state certain powers over the person, 
including power to subject the person to judgments of the state’s 
courts. 
C. Corporations and the Home-State Test for General Jurisdiction 
A similar logic extends to corporations. Although some rights 
and duties of citizenship, such as voting and jury service, do not 
extend to corporations, the home-state idea at the heart of Milliken 
makes sense in the corporate context. When a corporation establishes 
a home-state relationship with a state, the relationship comes with 
responsibilities including amenability to suit. In contrast to specific 
jurisdiction, where the state has an interest in the conduct at issue in 
the dispute, general jurisdiction concerns the state’s interest in the 
defendant itself by virtue of the defendant’s relationship with the 
forum state. 
 
 13.  See, e.g., THE MASSACHUSETTS JURY SYSTEM, http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/jury-
system-b.html (last visited July 18, 2013) (noting jury eligibility of temporarily absent residents 
and college students). 
 14.  See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941) (“If the United States may control the 
conduct of its citizens upon the high seas, we see no reason why the State of Florida may not 
likewise govern the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas with respect to matters in which 
the State has a legitimate interest and where there is no conflict with acts of Congress.”); Stein, 
supra note 4, at 538; see also I. Glenn Cohen, Circumvention Tourism, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1309, 
1328–35 (2012) (analyzing, in the context of medical tourism, the extent to which a home country 
may prohibit conduct by its citizens abroad). 
 15.  Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463–64 (1940). 
 16.  Id. at 464; see also Feder, supra note 12, at 691 (“The only basis our law has 
traditionally recognized for state authority over conduct unrelated to the state is the unique 
relationship between a state and its citizens or residents.”); Stein, supra note 4, at 539 (“[G]iving 
the home state plenary judicial authority over its citizens comports with a broader, universal 
authority that states normally possess over their citizens.”). 
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Although home-state may not offer perfect precision, it aptly 
captures the idea of general jurisdiction. Particularly in contrast to 
the continuous and systematic language that has befuddled courts for 
too long, the home-state test provides better grounding. 
What is a corporation’s home state? The soundest answer, 
although less neat than other possible formulations, is that a 
corporation is at home in its state of incorporation as well as its 
principal place of business, and that in exceptional cases a corporation 
may have more than one principal place of business for this purpose. 
The state of incorporation should be considered a home state for 
general jurisdiction. When an entity exists because it was created 
under the laws of a particular state, the state’s assertion of judicial 
power over it does not constitute territorial overreaching.17 Principal 
place of business, too, should be considered a corporation’s home state 
for purposes of general personal jurisdiction. The relationship of a 
corporation to its primary home is one that gives the state a 
generalized interest in the conduct and liability of the corporation. In 
this sense, General Motors Company is at home in Michigan and the 
Walt Disney Company is at home in California, even though each of 
these companies was incorporated in Delaware and thus also could be 
subject to general jurisdiction there. 
In exceptional circumstances, a corporation might have more 
than one home state even in addition to its state(s) of incorporation. A 
company may have dual headquarters, each of which could reasonably 
be considered home.18 Or the company may have executive control in 
one state but primary operations in another. Unlike the definition of 
principal place of business under the diversity jurisdiction statute,19 
there is no reason why general jurisdiction cannot encompass multiple 
home states in special cases. 
When thinking about the possibility of multiple home states, 
the analogy to citizenship is helpful. While the citizen-state 
relationship need not be perfectly exclusive, neither can it be diffuse. 
 
 17.  See Stein, supra note 4, at 547 (explaining such jurisdiction in terms of voluntary 
submission to the state’s authority). 
 18.  See Phred Dvorak, Why Multiple Headquarters Multiply, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2007 
(discussing the growth of internationally dual-headquartered companies). The Halliburton 
Company, for example, maintains headquarters in both Houston and Dubai. See Clifford Krauss, 
Halliburton to Move Headquarters to Dubai, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007. One could reasonably 
name Texas, the United Arab Emirates, and Delaware (its state of incorporation) as 
Halliburton’s homes, because the company has affirmatively established a home-state 
relationship with each of these sovereigns. But it would stretch the concept beyond recognition to 
say that Halliburton’s home state is each of the dozens of states and nations where it maintains 
substantial offices or operations. 
 19.  See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010) (interpreting “principal place of 
business” in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) to mean the corporation’s nerve center). 
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Individuals often maintain subnational or supranational citizenship 
alongside their national citizenship.20 Moreover, the United States 
and many other nations recognize the possibility of dual-national 
citizenship.21 To the extent these versions of multiple citizenship 
permit allegiance to more than one sovereign, they presume at most a 
small number of states with which the citizen forms such a 
relationship. 
In sum, just as Milliken justified general jurisdiction over 
individuals in terms of the relationship between a person and the 
person’s home state, a home-state test makes sense when applied to 
corporations.22 As far as due process is concerned, a state court may 
assert power over a person (whether individual or corporate) in the 
person’s home state. A corporation should be considered at home in its 
state of incorporation as well as its principal place of business. In 
exceptional cases, a corporation might have more than one principal 
place of business for purposes of general jurisdiction, but a home state 
should be where the corporation maintains its headquarters or its 
principal operations, not merely someplace where a corporation does 
business or maintains a physical presence. 
III. GOODYEAR’S HESITANT ARTICULATION OF THE HOME-STATE TEST 
In Goodyear, the Supreme Court stopped short of articulating 
what I am calling the home-state test. Three times, the Court used the 
phrase at home, but never did the Court explicitly state that this was 
the test courts should apply to determine whether the exercise of 
 
 20.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.”); Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 20(1) (“Every 
person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of 
the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.”). 
 21.  See Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133, 169 (1795) (opinion of Rutledge, C.J.) (“[A] man may, 
at the same time, enjoy the rights of citizenship under two governments.”); U.S. STATE DEP’T 
SERVS., Dual Nationality, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1753.html (visited July 
18, 2013) (“The concept of dual nationality means that a person is a citizen of two countries at 
the same time. . . . The U.S. Government recognizes that dual nationality exists but does not 
encourage it as a matter of policy because of the problems it may cause.”).  
 22.  Michael Hoffheimer writes that “[t]he restriction of general jurisdiction over a 
corporation to a place where it is ‘at home’ is troubling.” Hoffheimer, supra note 4, at 583. 
Calling the “at home” language a “neologism lacking any fixed legal meaning,” id. at 583, he 
argues that “the law recognizes that a corporation may have significant legal relationships with 
more than one state.” Id. at 584. While Hoffheimer is correct that “at home” lacks a fixed legal 
meaning, the phrase offers more precision than the notion of continuous and systematic contacts, 
which has held a disturbingly wide range of meanings in the cases. Hoffheimer is also correct 
that corporations have significant legal relationships with multiple states. But the question is 
not what justifies power in connection with conduct related to the forum state; the question is 
what sort of relationship justifies plenary judicial power. 
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general jurisdiction complies with due process.23 Moreover, the Court 
qualified its language in ways that could call into question whether it 
meant to adopt a home-state test. 
The closest the Court came in Goodyear to announcing a home-
state test was in the fourth paragraph of the opinion.  Having set up 
the connection between the state’s coercive power and defendants’ due 
process rights, and having drawn the distinction between specific and 
general jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg wrote: 
 
A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign 
(sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any 
and all claims against them when their affiliations with 
the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render 
them essentially at home in the forum State.24 
 
There are four problems with treating this sentence as a home-
state test for corporate general jurisdiction. First, by stating that a 
court may assert jurisdiction “when” rather than “only when,” the 
sentence arguably states a sufficient condition rather than a necessary 
one. Second, Justice Ginsburg used the qualifier “essentially at home.”  
Third, by invoking “continuous and systematic,” she seemed to 
embrace the old standard. And fourth, by framing the statement as 
one about jurisdiction over “foreign (sister-state or foreign country) 
corporations,” she implied that general jurisdiction extends beyond in-
state corporations. 
Nonetheless, it makes sense to derive a home-state test from 
Goodyear. The phrase essentially at home can be understood as 
accommodating Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,25 the 
only case in which the Supreme Court approved general jurisdiction 
over a corporation. In Perkins, the defendant was a foreign corporation 
that temporarily ran its business from Ohio, where the company 
president was located, while operations in the Philippines were shut 
down during wartime. The Benguet mining company was “essentially 
at home” in Ohio while headquartered there, despite its permanent 
home abroad. The Goodyear language about general jurisdiction over 
foreign corporations similarly can be explained by Perkins, but also 
may simply refer to any defendant incorporated out-of-state but with 
its principal place of business in the forum state. 
 
 23.  The Court also signaled a home-state test by citing Lea Brilmayer’s work on the 
significance of unique affiliations. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (citing Lea Brilmayer et al., A 
General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721 (1988)). 
 24.  Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).  
 25.  342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
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The Goodyear Court’s next reference to “at home” omitted the 
word “essentially” and the language about foreign corporations. 
Significantly, the Court framed the concept by drawing an analogy to 
individual domicile: “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the 
exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a 
corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is 
fairly regarded as at home.”26 But even this language invites 
questions, because the paradigm forum for general jurisdiction is not 
necessarily the only forum. 
When the Goodyear Court came around to stating that North 
Carolina could not exercise general jurisdiction over the defendants, it 
stated the holding in terms that first seemed to embrace a home-state 
test. But the very next sentence recalled the “continuous and 
systematic” language, leaving some doubt about which test the Court 
was applying.27 Although the Goodyear Court’s multiple references to 
whether the defendants were “at home” in North Carolina leave a 
strong impression of a home-state test for corporate general 
jurisdiction, each reference falls short of an outright adoption of such a 
test. If the Court means to adopt such a test, then in DaimlerChrysler 
it should embrace the home-state test unequivocally. 
Notwithstanding the complicating language in Goodyear, it 
seems clear the Court meant to embrace at least some version of a 
home-state test. In J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro,28 a specific 
jurisdiction case decided the same day, the Justices’ references to 
general jurisdiction support the view that Goodyear endorsed a home-
state test. Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion, citing Goodyear, 
stated, “Citizenship or domicile—or, by analogy, incorporation or 
principal place of business for corporations—also indicates general 
submission to a State’s powers. . . . By contrast, those who live or 
operate primarily outside a State have a due process right not to be 
subjected to judgment in its courts as a general matter.”29 Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent, also citing Goodyear, likewise assumed a home-
state test: “McIntyre UK surely is not subject to general (all-purpose) 
jurisdiction in New Jersey courts, for that foreign-country corporation 
is hardly ‘at home’ in New Jersey.”30 
 
 26.  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54. 
 27.  See id. at 2857 (“Unlike the defendant in Perkins, whose sole wartime business activity 
was conducted in Ohio, petitioners are in no sense at home in North Carolina. Their attenuated 
connections to the State fall far short of the “continuous and systematic general business 
contacts” necessary to empower North Carolina to entertain suit against them on claims 
unrelated to anything that connects them to the State.”) (citations omitted). 
 28.  131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 29.  Id. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., plurality). 
 30.  Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE HOME-STATE TEST 
The home-state test should resolve several questions about 
general jurisdiction. First, it suggests that corporations are not subject 
to general jurisdiction in states other than their states of 
incorporation and principal places of business, even if they conduct 
regular and substantial business in the forum state. Second, it informs 
how courts should consider the contacts of related corporate entities, 
particularly suggesting the inapplicability of agency principles to 
general jurisdiction. Finally, the home-state test should lead courts to 
abandon the so-called “reasonableness prong” for general jurisdiction. 
A. Out-of-State Corporations with Substantial In-State Presence 
It should be clear by now that the Due Process Clause prohibits 
general jurisdiction in cases like Goodyear and DaimlerChrysler where 
defendants lack any substantial presence in the forum state. But the 
more interesting question is the extent to which courts 
constitutionally may exercise general jurisdiction over defendants who 
do have a substantial presence in the forum state. 
Starbucks Corporation, for example, has over four hundred 
company-owned stores in the State of New York,31 among its many 
thousands of locations around the world. If a customer were to sue 
Starbucks based on an injury at one of its New York shops, or if a New 
York employee were to sue Starbucks for wrongful termination, no one 
would dispute that a New York court may render a binding judgment 
against Starbucks. This would be a straightforward application of 
specific jurisdiction. But if an Alabama customer were to sue 
Starbucks in New York based on an injury in Alabama, or if an 
Alabama employee were to sue in New York for wrongful termination, 
would the New York court have jurisdiction over Starbucks? 
Prior to 2011, many courts and commentators would have said 
yes. Based on Starbucks’s continuous and systematic contacts, many 
would have said that New York courts could assert general 
jurisdiction even though the company is headquartered and 
incorporated in the State of Washington. Indeed, courts have 
permitted general jurisdiction over companies with much, much less 
presence in a state than Starbucks in New York.32 But such “doing 
 
 31.  NY Court: Starbucks Baristas Must Share Tips, USA TODAY (June 26, 2013), available 
at http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/06/26/ny-court-starbucks-baristas-must-
share-tips/2459851/ (reporting that Starbucks had 413 company-owned stores in New York at the 
end of its last fiscal year, and that the company has nearly 18,000 stores in 60 countries). 
 32.  See, e.g., Lakin v. Prudential Sec’s, Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 2003); Michigan 
Nat’l Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 465–67 (6th Cir. 1989). From a comparative 
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business” jurisdiction should not survive Goodyear. As discussed 
above, the best reading of Goodyear—a reading that the Court should 
adopt in DaimlerChrysler—permits general jurisdiction over 
corporations only in their home states. Despite the fact that one need 
only walk a block or two in many Manhattan neighborhoods to feel the 
presence of Starbucks, the company’s home state is undeniably 
Washington. In contrast to Washington’s general judicial power over 
its home-state corporation, nothing justifies New York’s assertion of 
power over Starbucks for claims unrelated to New York. 
B. The Home-State Test and Imputed Corporate Contacts 
Persons—whether individual or corporate—often act through 
agents. For a corporation, it is the only way to act. Long-arm statutes 
extend jurisdiction to persons who, either directly or through an 
agent, transact business in a state or engage in certain other conduct 
directed at the state.33 This is the stuff of specific jurisdiction. One 
who transacts business in a state through an agent, or commits a tort 
within a state through an agent, and so on, may be subject to the 
power of that state’s courts to adjudicate claims that arise out of those 
contacts. Such assertions of judicial power over out-of-state 
defendants do not violate the Due Process Clause. 
The Ninth Circuit in Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler, however, 
used the agency concept much more troublingly. That court held that 
DaimlerChrysler was subject to the general jurisdiction of California 
through the imputed contacts of its indirect subsidiary Mercedes-Benz 
USA (“MBUSA”) because MBUSA was DaimlerChrysler’s agent.34 
According to the Ninth Circuit, general jurisdiction over a parent 
company may be established by the in-state operations of a subsidiary 
as long as the parent-subsidiary relationship meets either the “alter 
ego test” or the “agency test.”35 
If general jurisdiction depends upon a home-state relationship 
between the defendant and the forum state, then the Ninth Circuit’s 
application of agency principles makes no sense. One cannot be at 
home through an agent. One cannot be a citizen through an agent. 
 
perspective, broad “doing business” general jurisdiction is a distinctly U.S. doctrine. See 
Silberman, supra note 4, at 611. 
 33.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 3104 (2013) (“As to a cause of action brought by any 
person arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over any nonresident, or a personal representative, who in person or through an 
agent . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 34.  Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler, 644 F.3d 909, 921–24 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. 
Ct. 1995 (2013). 
 35.  Id. at 920. 
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When a principal acts through an agent who is a citizen of a state, the 
principal does not thereby become a citizen. The principal’s conduct 
through the agent may subject the principal to specific jurisdiction for 
claims arising out of the conduct, but it does not alter the principal’s 
home state. While an alter ego theory might provide a basis for 
treating related corporations as a single entity for purposes of 
determining home state, it is hard to see how agency principles can do 
the same. The Ninth Circuit in DaimlerChrysler relied entirely on an 
agency theory,36 but the home-state logic of general jurisdiction does 
not support this approach.37 
C. The Home-State Test and the Reasonableness Prong 
In the DaimlerChrysler case, the Ninth Circuit conducted a 
lengthy analysis of whether it would be “reasonable” for California to 
assert personal jurisdiction over DaimlerChrysler. As some other 
courts have done, the Ninth Circuit treated the reasonableness prong 
as a necessary step in its general jurisdiction analysis.38 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that due process requires 
an analysis of whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be 
reasonable, at least for specific jurisdiction.39 Thus, specific 
jurisdiction requires a two-prong analysis. Not only must the case 
arise out of defendant’s purposeful contact with the forum state, but 
also the assertion of jurisdiction must be reasonable, taking into 
account the burden on the defendant, the interest of the plaintiff, and 
the interest of the forum state. Although uncommon, cases such as 
 
 36.  Bauman, 644 F.3d at 620. 
 37.  Moreover, although in the Bauman case (litigated prior to the Supreme Court’s 
Goodyear decision) the parties did not dispute that MBUSA itself was subject to general 
jurisdiction in California, id. at 914, this assumption is questionable after Goodyear. MBUSA 
was a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in New Jersey. 
Although it had offices and operations in California and conducted significant business there, no 
one would describe California as MBUSA’s home state. Similarly, in Goodyear, the parties did 
not contest North Carolina’s general jurisdiction over Goodyear USA, an Ohio corporation. See 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011) (“Goodyear USA, 
which had plants in North Carolina and regularly engaged in commercial activity there, did not 
contest the North Carolina court’s jurisdiction over it.”). In light of the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in that case, the assumption may have been misguided. 
 38.  Bauman, 644 F.3d at 924 (“Because we hold that there is ample evidence of an agency 
relationship between DCAG and MBUSA, and, thus, that MBUSA's contacts with California may 
be imputed to DCAG, we now must turn to the second part of our test: whether the assertion of 
jurisdiction is ‘reasonable.’ ”).  
 39.  See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987); Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–78 (1985). The Supreme Court has not addressed whether 
the reasonableness prong applies to general jurisdiction. See Hoffheimer, supra note 4, at 589 
n.229. 
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Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court40 arise, in which the 
defendant’s burden is so significant and the plaintiff’s and forum’s 
interests so slight, that the assertion of jurisdiction would be 
unreasonable even if the claim arose out of a purposeful contact with 
the state. 
If general jurisdiction is sensibly confined to home-state 
defendants, there should be no need for a reasonableness prong. The 
very idea of general jurisdiction is that a state’s adjudicatory power 
over its own citizens is reasonable, without regard to the 
particularities of the case. Whether the defendant is an individual 
domiciliary, an entity incorporated by the forum state, or a 
corporation that makes the forum its principal place of business, the 
state can reasonably assert territorial jurisdiction over that defendant. 
Application of the reasonableness prong to general jurisdiction is an 
artifact of an overenthusiastic embrace of “doing business” 
jurisdiction. The home-state test should eliminate the need for this 
prong by eliminating the problematic assertions of power that it was 
meant to address. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Goodyear, the Supreme Court applied a home-state test for 
general personal jurisdiction over corporations, but did so with enough 
ambiguity that clarification is needed. DaimlerChrysler provides the 
opportunity. The home-state test aptly captures the idea behind 
general jurisdiction. The relationship between a person (individual or 
corporate) and the person’s home state gives the state a sufficiently 
plenary interest to warrant exercising adjudicatory power over the 
person with regard to any dispute. 
Like citizenship, the home-state relationship need not be 
perfectly exclusive, but neither can it be diffuse. An individual’s home 
state is her state of domicile. A corporation’s home state is its state of 
incorporation as well as its principal place of business, which in 
exceptional cases may be multiple (such as companies with dual 
headquarters or whose nerve center and primary operations are in 
different states). Outside of defendant’s home state(s), jurisdiction 
must be premised on the state’s regulatory interest in the conduct at 
issue, not a plenary power over the defendant’s person. Thus, while 
individuals and corporations may be subject to specific personal 
jurisdiction wherever they direct their conduct, they should be subject 
to general personal jurisdiction only in their home states. 
 
 40.  480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
94 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW EN BANC [Vol. 66:81 
The home-state rationale for general jurisdiction reveals the 
illogic of imputing a subsidiary’s contacts to a parent corporation 
based on agency principles. While specific jurisdiction often is 
premised on contacts through agents, it makes no sense to apply the 
same concept to general jurisdiction. One can direct conduct toward a 
state through an agent, but one cannot be at home through an agent. 
Finally, the home-state test provides a basis to jettison the 
reasonableness prong that some courts have applied to general 
jurisdiction. 
 
